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European Union economies are pressed by (i) a  demographic change that induces population 
ageing and a decline of the workforce, and (ii) a split labour market that is characterized by high 
levels of unemployment for low-skilled people and a simultaneous shortage of skilled workers. 
This lack of flexible high-skilled workers and the aging process has created the image of an 
immobile labour force and the eurosklerosis phenomenon. In such a situation, an economically 
motivated immigration policy  at the European level  can generate welfare improvements. A 
selective policy that discourages unskilled migrants and attracts skilled foreign workers will 
vitalize the labour market, foster growth and increase demand for unskilled native workers. The 
paper summarizes the available economic insights, and suggests (i) the need to harmonize the 
single-country migration policies across Europe and (ii) that the European Union  needs to 





JEL classification: J61, J21, J68, J82, F22 
Keywords: labour mobility, migration, skilled migration, unskilled migration, migration policy, 
integration policy  
 
 
* Paper presented at the high-level expert conference "Jobs for Europe" on the Social Policy Agenda for the 
European Union on October 25-26, 2004 in Amsterdam. The author is President of the German Institute for 
Economic Research (DIW Berlin), Director of the Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn, Professor of 
Economics at the University of Bonn, and Honorary Professor at the Free University of Berlin. He thanks Aart Jan 
Bette,  Henk Don, Renske Gerstel, Klara Scheepers,  Jan van der Velden and other members of the editorial 
committee, and Amelie Constant, Don DeVoretz, Holger Hinte and Stephanie Wei Wang for many useful comments 
on earlier drafts. 
 
Corresponding author: 
Klaus F. Zimmermann 
IZA, P.O. Box 7240 
D-53072 Bonn, Germany 
Phone: +49 228 3894 200 
Fax: +49 228 3894 210  1 
1. Key Challenges and Trends 
 
Labour inflexibility has been seen for long as the major determinant of the employment crisis 
and the persistent slump of economic  growth in Europe.
1 In particular, geographical labour 
mobility has been suggested as a strong instrument to foster fast economic adjustment and 
growth. It has also been argued that inflexibility of workers might be no problem when  internal 
labour markets within companies would work well.2  If there exists substantial firm-specific 
human capital, inter-firm mobility might be too costly. Also individuals  may  appreciate 
inflexibility, because this allows them to live in stable social networks. Consequently, it does not 
seem surprising that intra-firm job mobility is often more frequent than inter-firm mobility.  
  While geographical and internal mobility can be both beneficial when employed in a 
balanced way, migration across regions within a country and between countries within Europe 
has been in decline over the last decades.3 Interregional migration plays a much smaller role in 
adjustment in Europe than in the United States, and this suggests that this is one important 
component that drives the relative success of the American economy. Europe has become more 
inflexible when the pressure to adjust became stronger, but  an explanation  of this worrying 
puzzle is that mobility reacts to the availability of jobs.4 While economic growth and the creation 
of new jobs is strongly associated with the willingness to take up chances across regions, the 
supply of jobs also regulates the flow of people seeking work. Only when a significant rise in 
economic growth will boost the demand for labour and create new jobs, geographic mobility of 
natives will rise significantly. Policy measures have hardly  a chance to influence this mobility 
and intra-firm mobility. Hence, immigration from outside the European Union has become a 
                                                   
1   See OECD (1994), for instance. 
2   See Zimmermann (1998). 
3   See Bauer, Dietz, Zimmermann and Zwintz (2004) for Germany,  Faini, Galli, Gennari and Rossi (1997) for 
Italy and Obstfeld and Peri (1998) for mobility within Europe. 
4   Bauer, Dietz, Zimmermann and Zwintz (2004) make this point to explain the decline in Germany, while Bover 
and Velilla (2004) show that the recent increase in Spanish mobility is associated with a rise in the availability 
of jobs.   2 
potentially  very  crucial role for the creation of a higher level of labour mobility in Europe. If 
there is labour mobility it is largely due to international migration. 
  However, in the globalised world, migration is a controversial and challenging issue. An 
estimated 175 million people  wordwide or about 2.9% of the world population  are currently 
considered  to be international migrants. Among other types of migrants, this number contains 
people moving for purposes of family reunification, refugees, and displaced persons; only very 
few are economic migrants. This evaluation  ignores illegal migrants who typically come for 
work. Europe is the most important continent for the migration issue showing a current stock of 
56 million migrants in the population, followed by Asia with 50 million, and North America with 
41 million. In spite of the rising importance of the issue, the understanding of the determinants 
and the consequences of these movements  is still limited, and the proper policy response still 
unprepared.  
  Migration challenges can be decomposed into a number of channels. A first channel  is 
unskilled migration. The poor and helpless of the world are knocking at the European  doors. 
Fortress Europe still stands, but at its borders from the East and the South illegal immigration of 
an unknown size and potential is surging. These aliens contribute to the rising excess supply of 
native  uns killed workers in the European host  countries by  seeking permanent gainful 
employment, more and more often with limited success. So far, immigration has not caused 
much measurable unemployment among natives. However, if  current trends prevail, 
unemployment among immigrants and unskilled  native  workers may increasingly rise. M ore 
social and economic disruptions would be the likely consequence. 
A second channel is  migration of the most skilled in the labour force. Human capital is 
the ultimate resource of the 21st century. All developed economies face a strong and increasing 
excess demand for skilled labour,  fostered by technological change, population aging and a 
subsequent  decline in the future native European workforce. The upcoming needs cannot  be 
satisfied  sufficiently  by the local labour force or  the educational system in the particular   3 
countries. Europe is  more and more drawn into a competition to attract international skilled 
labour to fill the gaps. However,  unlike traditional immigration countries as the United States, 
Canada or Australia, Europe has no reputation on the international labour markets for high-
skilled people. Migration, return migration, onward migration and circular migration are the new 
challenging phenomena in this phase of the internationalisation of the labour market.  
A third channel for the global impact of migration on the economy is the required 
productive mix of skilled and unskilled workers at the workplace. It is increasingly observed that 
the lack of qualified workers decreases the incentives to hire low -skilled workers. The increasing 
excess-demand of companies for high-skilled workers is then associated with the growing gap in 
jobs for the low-skilled. If Europe fails to train enough people or to attract high-skilled labour, 
there will be soon a pressing need to develop markets that supply jobs for unskilled labour. 
Factor mobility is the fourth channel of labour competition. If people do not move or are 
not allowed to move, trade or capital mobility may take its place. For i nstance, cheap labour is 
embodied into the imports of goods, and this threatens home production and low-skilled workers 
in particular. Virtual migration is the ultimate threat: Many jobs can be exercised through the 
internet. Companies more and more outsource their jobs by going global. European jobs may 
thus melt away without any real movement in the foreign work force. 
Fifth, the expansion of the European Union will trigger further immigration into major 
European countries and create new market opportunities in Central and Eastern Europe. This is, 
certainly a transition issue, whereas the inflow of low-skilled people has already largely taken 
place through illegal immigration. Now, the European  Union countries need to ensure that the 
mobile high-skilled East Europeans are not attracted mainly by the traditional immigration 
countries. 
A sixth challenge is that a large part of the current migrants in the European Union are 
not available for the labour market, since they did not come as economic migrants but through 
family reunification and as asylum seekers who are not supposed to work. Missing incentives   4 
and individual characterics of migrants. This is a major policy failure, since Europe as a whole 
has received large migration flows over the last decades. Ho wever, this has been an uncontrolled 
and unwanted development that has left the union unprepared. 
The European Union will soon have to decide how to meet these challenges in an 
organized, systematic, and collaborative way. Is a continuation of the current policy of neglect 
still acceptable, or does the European Union need a common labour migration policy that is more 
pragmatic and “rational” in the sense that it considers economic interests? In order to develop an 
appropriate policy, it is necessary to learn more about how immigrants currently fare in 
European member countries, and how they affect the economic well-being of the native 
populations and public sector finances. It is furthermore important to understand how policy 
measures have contributed to the current migration situation. Note that while immigration has 
many dimensions (including social and humanitarian), this paper deals with the issue from a 
purely economic perspective. 
 
2. Some Relevant Economic Migration Theories 
 
Economic theories concerning migration seen from the host country  can be organised around 
three major themes:5 (i) the determinants of migration, (ii) the assimilation of the migrants, and 
(iii) the effects of the immigrants on the natives.  Migration decisions
6  respond largely to 
differences in regional disparities in prosperity. Hence,  differences in earnings, unemployment 
rates,  costs of living, public goods and public transfers are important determinants of a move. 
The decision to move is also affected by the costs of moving that not only include monetary 
costs like travel expenses, and foregone earnings dur ing the move, but also psychological costs 
arising from the separation from family and friends. According to the human capital model, the 
likelihood of migration is decreasing with age, reflecting the smaller expected lifetime gain from 
moving for older people. Individuals with higher education should exhibit a higher migration 
                                                   
5   The four volumes by Zimmermann and Bauer (2002) collect the most relevant research papers in the literature 
outlining the theories of migration, immigrant assimilation and their effects on the natives. 
6   A review of the literature on the migration decision is provided by Bauer and Zimmermann (1998).   5 
probability, because higher education reduces the risks of migration through a higher ability to 
collect and process information. The risks and costs of movements are expected to rise with 
distance, because information about labour market conditions is expected to be better for closer 
locations. Family issues also typically play an important role. Most migrants move within the 
context of ethnic networks , resulting in the formation of ethnic clusters in the host country. The 
mere existence of network and chain migration significantly alleviates the risks and costs and 
accelerates movement. 
How do the migrants fare? This is the question of assimilation and integration into the 
labour market of the host country.7 According to the standard economic models in this field, the 
degree of assimilation is influenced by  individual  factors, the cha racteristics of the home 
country, the migration motive, and the expected migration duration. The greater the similarity 
between the sending and the receiving countries in relation to their economic development, the 
more rapid the assimilation. Individuals who migrate for economic reasons, permanent migrants 
and those with good knowledge of the language of the host country  are expected to assimilate 
and integrate faster than non-economic and temporary migrants.  
A key issue is the international transferability of human capital. Human capital acquired 
at home may not be fully transferable to the host county. Hence, there is an expected negative 
relationship between the transferability of human capital and the initial immigrant-native 
earnings gap. The lower the international transferability of human capital, the higher is the 
earnings disadvantage of the immigrants at the time of migration. With increasing time of 
residence in the host country, migrants invest in country-specific human capital of the receiving 
country and adapt their stock of human capital acquired in the home country. As a consequence, 
the human capital of the migrants grows relatively faster than  the human capital of the natives, 
and the earnings of the immigrants approach but may not reach those of the natives. 
                                                   
7   Bauer, Lofstrom and Zimmermann (2000) deal with this issue and incorporate a study of natives' sentiments 
towards immigrants. Assimilation in an economic sense simply means getting a job an earn as much as natives 
with identical characteristics. 
   6 
How are the natives  affected by the migrants?
8 Crucial  here are the conditions on the 
labour markets of the host country; they might be either competitive or in disequilibrium when 
labour supply equals labour demand or not, respectively. A further point of departure is that the 
labour force is heterogeneous and of diverse quality, while it depends on whether immigrants are 
unskilled or skilled. Disequilibrium situations in labour markets may occur, when  there are 
institutional constraints in the market for unskilled labour such as union wages, minimum wages 
or transfers like social assistance, or when the educational system is not providing sufficiently 
fast the necessary supply  of workers  for the skilled labour markets.  Another issue is whether 
skilled and unskilled workers are complements or substitutes to natives. A reasonable (and 
standard) assumption is that skilled and unskilled workers are complements. 
If there is unemployment among low-skilled workers due to institutional constraints like 
union wages, more unskilled migrants willing to work will make this market more competitive 
and add  also  additional jobs for the natives through reduced wages.  If  immigrants  are 
predominantly unskilled, then they are substitutes for unskilled natives creating friction and 
complements to skilled natives contributing to their advancement. Accordingly, new immigrants 
may depress wages and likely increase unemployment of the unskilled workers and may induce 
the reverse effects for skilled natives. The reverse scenario will occur with skilled immigration. 
Hence, in a situation of unskilled unemployment and excess demand for skilled work, it makes 
sense to allow for high-skilled labour migrants.  
Institutional constraints on the labour markets, high unemployment among the low-
skilled and excess demand for the skilled workers describe the predominant situation in the 
European Union, currently and in the longer-term future. A selective immigration policy that 
tends to avoid unskilled migrants and attracts skilled foreign workers will, therefore, be a safe 
                                                   
8   Borjas (1994) and Bauer and Zimmermann (1997) investigate this issue conceptually, while Borjas (1994) 
deals with the equilibrium situation only and  Bauer and Zimmermann  (1997) consider also disequilibrium 
situations in the labour markets.   7 
strategy to  foster growth,  increase demand for unskilled native workers, and be beneficial. This 
substantiates how migrants can be economically good friends to natives in the labour market.  
The  policy  challenge is to optimize  migration  to increase welfare by identifying and 
mobilising the economic component of the process. In a  long-term steady-state where migrants 
are fully assimilated in the sense that they are alike to the natives, with similar human capital and 
physical capital, there is no real advantage, but also no disadvantage for the host nation. 
According to standard economic models, the production possibilities are then just shifting 
outwards with no effects on the income distribution and  the welfare levels. However, when 
migrants are different but in demand, when they bring variety into the labour force, and when 
they improve the speed of the adjustment of the host economy to its long-run needs, they are of 
invaluable help. 
 
3. Empirical Evidence 
 
This section provides an overview of the rich experiences in Europe of migration regimes, the 
performance of the migrants and their effects on the native population, which are all well 
documented in the economic literature.
9   
3.1 Long-term Migration Policy Regimes Across Europe 
  There is a common migration history after World War II across Western European 
countries.10 Europe b ecame one of the main regions for receiving  the  migrants of the world. 
There are four relevant phases of post-war migration into Europe;  periods of (i)  post-war 
                                                   
9   See Faini, de Melo and Zimmermann (1999), Boeri, Hanson and McCormick (2002), Zimmermann and Bauer 
(2002),  Zimmermann (2004), Zimmermann and Constant (2004),  Tranaes and Zimmermann (2004), and 
Venturini (2004). Roodenburg, Euwals and ter Rele (2003) provide findings for the Netherlands. Their analysis 
of the labour market effects of immigrants is based on a comparison between labour market equilibria before 
and after immigration, while Bauer and Zimmermann (1997) have also calculated the effects in disequilibrium 
situations, which are much more substantial. 
10   For a deeper analysis of these historical trends see Zimmermann (1995a, 1995b).   8 
adjustment and decolonisation,  (ii) labour migration,  (iii) restrained migration, and  (iv) 
dissolution of socialism and afterwards.  
The first period covers the years between 1945 and up to  the early 1960s. In this period 
Germany experienced a strong inflow of people displaced by the war. Great Britain, France, 
Belgium and the Netherlands were affected by return migration from European colonies and the 
inflow of workers from the former overseas territories. Algerians of French origin  were 
repatriated to France after the independence of Algeria. The Netherlands experienced a large 
inflow of immigrants from Indonesia in 1946 and 1950. This has been a period of pure supply 
driven migration. 
The second phase of labour migration lasts until the first oil price crisis 1973/74, and was 
largely motivated by demand factors. The strong economic growth and the resulting labour 
shortages in the second half of the 1950s and the 1960s induced a number of Western European 
countries to open up for immigration. Some of the countries even established an active 
recruitment policy, or guestworker regime. Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, Switzerland, 
Denmark and Sweden actively recruited unskilled workers from the Southern European 
countries. Labour migration in this period was mainly motivated by wage differences between 
the South and the North. Germany and Switzerland opted for temporary  migration as a response 
to labour shortages. However, Switzerland with its rotation principle was more successful than 
Germany was with the guestworker system. German work contracts and residence permits were 
supposed to be temporary. However, since these temporary arrangements were not enforced, the 
guestworker programs resulted in permanent migration. Return migrants to Belgium, the 
Netherlands, the United Kingdom and France were also permanent, since they were the 
consequence of decolonisation. 
Restrained  migration is the third phase of post-war migration into Europe. In the face of 
increased social tensions and fears about recession after the first oil price shock, the governments 
all over Europe stopped active recruitment from 1973  onwards. Immigration policies became   9 
more restrictive affecting labour migrants  exclusively. Although the guestworker system was 
designed for temporary workers, return migration started only slowly. As a consequence, the 
main channels of immigration became family reunification and humanitarian immigration.  
The fourth phase of European migration can be identified at the end of the 1980s, when 
migration flows to Western Europe were dominated by East-West migration and the inflow of 
asylum seekers and refugees. Ethnic Germans migrating to Germany played a substantial part in 
this. Whereas in the 1970s and 1980s, asylum seekers originated mainly from Asia and Africa, 
the inflow of asylum seekers and refugees from European countries increased significantly in the 
1990s,  originating in the dissolution of the political regimes in the former socialist states in 
Eastern Europe. However, also the cl ashes between Turks and Kurds in the South-East of Turkey 
generated a substantial number of additional refugees. Around 1992 some European countries, 
especially Germany, became more restrictive towards the immigration of asylum seekers and 
refugees. But most European countries did not further restrict their refugee and asylum policies. 
Sweden, Denmark, the Nethe rlands, France, and Switzerland continued to accept larger numbers 
of refugees.  
Although migration policies were enunciated in different ways across Europe, they have 
some evident similarities and joint lessons. There were active labour recruitment policies in 
many countries that have been quite successful to foster economic growth and development; they 
came to a common halt around the time of the first oil crisis in 1973. However, assimilation 
policies were not followed or turned out to be not very successful. A temporary migration policy 
in a general system of regulated migration only works when it is based on a very strict rotation 
system as in Switzerland. Germany, with its guest worker system, actually received permanent 
migrants.11 Even the French model, with its planned settlements and the Republican assimilation 
principles ignored the migration dynamics. Family or chain migration has counteracted many 
                                                   
11   This is because of the ban on migration in 1973. If migrants were free to move back and forth, they would not 
have settled in Germany.   10 
policy objectives. A crucial phenomenon is return migration. Among economic migrants and 
within a system of free labour mobility, a large share of migrants return home eventually. 
However, if borders are closed and labour migration is heavily regulated, migrants stay in the 
host country and are followed by their families.  
3.2 Assimilation and Impacts on the Natives 
  A large number of studies in the economic literature12 have investigated the empirical 
answers to the key economic questions of immigration: Are migrants taking jobs away and 
depressing the wages of the natives, or do they contribute to the creation of jobs and increase the 
general level of wages? Do they adjust to the host country's labour market, in the sense that they 
work, perform well, as well as natives or even better than natives in the labour market? Are they 
just a burden on the welfare state or do they impart economic gains through increased 
productivity and higher tax revenues and social security payments? 
  The Nordic welfare states, especially Denmark and Sweden, do not seem to receive many 
typical labour migrants. In recent years, the number of non-European migrants has increased 
mainly due to the immigration of relatives and refugees. First generation migrants are not faring 
well in comparison to natives, but second generation migrants are becoming more similar to the 
natives. The relative success of second generation migrants can be traced to the relevance of 
parental capital and to neighbourhood effects especially through the  probability of improving 
educational levels. Immigrants and refugees tend to concentrate in a few neighbourhoods in the 
bigger towns or cities with subsequent political tensions and social frictions. 
  Ireland and Great Britain share a common migration experience through the large Irish 
emigration to the British island. Ireland has traditionally been an emigration country, while the 
                                                   
12   The overview in this and the next section is based on the findings of two large international research teams 
directed by the author. Zimmermann (2004) collects country chapters of the major European countries and 
traditional immigration countries written by international experts that summarize the research findings in the 
literature for the years after World War II. Tranaes and Zimmermann (2004) and their authors study the 
recently collected micro data from a bi-national migration survey for Denmark and Germany. Both books deal 
intensively with work participation and earnings of the migrants as with their effects on the labor market 
performance of natives.   11 
United Kingdom has largely restricted immigration to people from its former colonies. Recently, 
and associated with the rising success of its economy, Ireland seemed to have benefited from the 
inflow of skilled people who have contributed well to the economy and assisted in reducing 
earnings inequality. While British migration is largely driven by economic incentives, the free 
flow of labour has been distorted by growing policy intervention. As a consequence, migration 
policy has become inextricably linked with domestic race relations policy. The ethnic minority 
population exhibits rising educational levels, especially in the second and subsequent 
generations. Labour market disadvantages seem not to reflect discrimination, but the slow 
assimilation process whereby immigrants  can only  improve their labour market status with 
length of residence.  
  Central Europe encompasses the traditionally attractive labour markets of Germany, 
Switzerland, Austria, the Benelux countries, and France. France has gone through similar phases 
of de-colonization and labour hiring as the Netherlands. French immigration policy has focused 
on people who were willing to accept the French language and culture. However, the majority of 
the immigrant population in France are manual workers and suffer from poor labour market 
conditions.  The Dutch  ethnic minorities are also  in a disadvantaged socio-economic position. 
Cultural aspects, less functional social networks and human capital factors are likely culprits of 
the immigrants' plight or marginalization. While s econd-generation migrants  are making 
progress, they are not fully integrated.  
  The most important European immigration country is Germany, which similar to the 
Netherlands has been traditionally the port for many labour migrants. Germany, however, has 
also attracted substantial inflows of non-economic migrants such as relatives, refugees, and 
ethnic Germans  from Eastern Europe. Ethnic Germans were generally found to assimilate, 
although at a slow rate. This has become more problematic with their recent immigration waves. 
Foreigners today are under more  labour market pressures than natives. This is largely the 
consequence of occupational status, and not of behaviour. Self-employment is a channel for   12 
integration into the economy. There is no real indication that migrants depress native wages or 
increase their unemployment risk. Immigration effects are either small or insignificant, or they 
have a positive impact on the economic situation of the natives.13 
  For decades, the southern European countries like Italy, Greece, Spain, and Portugal were 
experiencing net outmigration. They are now in a process to become traditional immigration 
countries, receiving people from Northern Africa, the Balkans, and other less developed parts of 
the world mostly through illegal immigration. The available Italian  research on the impact of 
foreign work ers on the natives has provided only few cases of negative findings. There is even 
some evidence of a complementarity between migrants and natives, suggesting that immigration 
may actually improve the labour market conditions of the natives. If the relationship is negative, 
like in the i llegal sector, the estimated effects are small and indicate a  negligible economic 
importance. An  exception is the illegal part in the agricultural sector where natives and migrants 
are strongly competitive. Illegal migrants in Greece are mostly in agriculture, but also in the 
construction and service industries. Studies show that foreign workers in agriculture largely took 
available vacancies and even generated their own jobs. Immigration did not raise the overall 
unemployment of natives, although in some selected industries such as construction and services 
there were some negative effects. Migration in Spain has become more internal, with a strong 
rise in intra-regional migration. This increase in migration is a response to the increased 
employment opportunities in the service sector in all Spanish regions. Although foreign 
immigration is still low in Spain as it is  in Portugal, its size is growing strongly and it is rapidly 
gaining attention.  
  The lessons one can draw from the  European  experience  are: In  the past, the labour 
market integration of migrants has been slow, but steady. The impact on the natives has not been 
                                                   
 
13   This indicates that migrants are either weak complements to natives or they bring with them particular abilities 
that are either in excess demand or not available at all in the host country. See section 2 above for a more 
detailed analysis. 
   13 
very strong, but mostly beneficial. However, with globalisation and the particular pressure on 
low-skilled workers and the increased demands on high-skilled people, the nature of the game 
seems to change. The economic position of the new immigrants has become weaker. From this 
perspective, a selective immigration policy appears to be even more important than before.  
3.3 A Recent Comparative Study: Denmark versus Germany 
  An international  comparative  research team studying the immigration experiences in 
Germany and Denmark using fresh survey data report the following findings:
14 There are greater 
ethnic differences in Germany than in Denmark with respect to both educational attainment and 
vocational training. Immigrants in Denmark are less well educated upon arrival, but they acquire 
more schooling once they are in the country compared to immigrants in Germany. In comparison 
to natives, there is severe under-employment of immigrants in both countries. The employment 
rate is lower for non-Western immigrants in Denmark than it is in Germany, although natives are 
more attached to the labour force in Denmark than in Germany. Immigrants have a larger 
presence in the German labour market than in Denmark. This difference can be explained by the 
fact that immigrants in Denmark are less educated upon arrival, and that financial incentives to 
work are low in Denmark due to an  unemployment benefit system that pays a higher replacement 
rate to the low-paid income groups.  Education and vocational attainment are powerful 
determinants of labour market attachment in both countries.  
  Whereas immigrants in Denmark are less financially motivated to seek employment than 
their counterparts in Germany, once at work, they earn more throughout their working lives than 
comparable immigrants in Germany. Although experience is not as well rewarded in Denmark, 
an initial earnings advantage upon arrival is sustained. Human capital acquired in the host 
country generates an earnings premium in both Denmark and Germany. 
                                                   
14   See Tranaes and Zimmermann (2004) and Zimmermann and Hinte (2004). 
   14 
  While Denmark seems to be a more attractive country for employed immigrant workers, 
Germany was found to offer better opportunities for entrepreneurs. Although t he self-
employment rates are similar in both countries,  self-employed immigrants in Germany are 
clearly positively self-selected, while those in Denmark seem to be more randomly allocated. 
Consequently, self-employed immigrants earn much more in Germany than in Denmark, and 
also much  more than migrant wage earners in Germany. The Danish self-employed migrants 
earn less than the salaried group. 
    Immigrants induce redistribution through public sector finances whereby the net transfers 
in public contributions typically go from Western immigrants to the public sector, and from the 
public sector to immigrants from non-Western countries. This confirms that depending on the 
selection mechanism immigrants can contribute substantially to public sector finances or are a 
net burden, which supports the proposal to obtain more labour migrants.15 The employed 
redistribution efforts bring the average disposable income of Danish non-Western immigrants 
much closer to the disposable income of native Danes. The  disposable income of Danish non-
Western immigrants is much higher than that of German non-Western immigrants. These Danish 
immigrants have almost the same distribution as native Danes, while the  distribution of 
disposable income in Germany of migrants is much more unequal.  
   
                                                   
15   Two recent studies have provided some quantitative evidence based on the intergenerational accounting 
approach. Zimmermann and Hinte (2004) show that Germany still gains a lot from the guestworker generation. 
Calculated on the basis of 1996, they find that the net financial contributions of these migrants over their 
lifetime has a present economic value of 35,000 Euro per head. Germans, however, due to an unfavoural age 
structure are receiving net transfers with a present value of 14,000 Euro and gain substantially from 
redistribution. The available Danish data allow Zimmermann and Hinte (2004) to calculate on the basis of 
2000 that Danes pay a net contribution with present value of 16,600 Euro per head, Western migrants pay 
39,700 Euros, and non-Western migrants receive 142,900 Euros. Roodenburg, Euwals and ter Rele (2003) also 
find that the current non-Western migrants in the Netherlands turn out to be a burden to the public budget, 
whereas migrants with similar characteristics as the Dutch population are net contributors. Roodenburg, 
Euwals and ter Rele (2003) state (p. 81): "The results presented in this study are more negative about the fiscal 
impact of immigration than c omparable studies for most other countries. Compared to the results for the 
United States and Germany, the differences mainly originate from the fact that labour market performances of 
immigrants in these countries do not lag as much behind those of natives as they do in the Netherlands." These 
numbers do not show that migration as such is a problem, they demonstrate that some past immigration and 
integration policies are problematic.   15 
  It can be concluded that Germany is able to attract better educated immigrants than 
Denmark, get them into employment, and offer more to people with entrepreneurial talents. 
Denmark keeps more immigrants in the welfare system, but offers better remuneration to regular 
workers and some incentives for immigrants to educate themselves at higher levels – but not to 
undertake vocational training. The findings reported here also suggest that both countries could 
benefit quite considerably by executing more  pro-active labour market recruitment and 
integration measures. Economic incentives seem to matter and a more selective immigration 
policy that generates more active labour market participants should be beneficial to the economy. 
 
4. Getting People to Work - the Challenge of the Lisbon Process  
 
In  response to various  concerns about the economic prospects of the European Union, the 
European Community has been implementing various political strategies. Among recent 
initiatives have been the  Lisbon Agenda, which aims at making Europe  by 2010  the most 
competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable 
economic growth, with more and better jobs and  greater social cohesion; and  Eastern 
enlargement, whose aim is to rapidly raise living standards in the new member states and to 
improve economic conditions in the European Union in general. Both initiatives have 
implications for migration and integration strategies. The Eastern enlargement process has 
caused debates about additional immigration from the East, since all labour markets will 
eventually have to open up to workers from the new member states. The newly agreed European 
Constitution also suggests that the social security systems of the host countries would take care 
of citizens from EU member states, which has created concerns about “country -hopping” and 
“welfare shopping”.  
  The Lisbon Agenda states that employment and economic policies should aim at a rise of 
the overall employment rate in Europe to as close as possible to 70% of the population aged 15-  16 
64, and an increase in the employment rate for women to more than 60% (Lisbon targets). An 
agreement of the  Stockholm European Council of 2001 sets intermediate targets for the 
employment rates in the EU in 2005 of 67% overall and 57% for females (Stockholm targets). In 
order to achieve these goals, the labour market implications of immigration have to be taken into 
account. 
  In June 2003, the European Commission adopted a  "Communication on Immigration, 
Integration, and Employment" that studied immigration in the context of demographic change 
and proposed a strategy to promote the better integration of immigrants and to prepare for 
attracting more immigrants in the medium-term future. The need for such initiatives is suggested 
by the fact that even if the Lisbon targets are achieved by 2010, employment in Europe will start 
to fall significantly afterwards, due to the aging of the population as a result of demographic 
changes. Achieving sustained economic growth would require a greater increase in productivity 
than what can probably be achieved. It is, therefore, important to mobilize the current stock of 
migrants to enter the labour market, and to prepare for new immigration by implementing better 
integration strategies. 
  How far is the Lisbon Agenda on its way and to what extent are its goals likely to be 
achieved for immigrants as well as others? The employment rates for 2002
16 suggest that the 
European Union is still far from reaching these goals. Increases of about 6 percentage points for 
the total EU employment rate (from 64.3% in 2002) and about 4 percentage points for the female 
EU employment rate (from 55.6%)  have to  be  materialized to  ensure that  the targets are 
achieved. EU-national immigrants exhibit overall higher employment rates (66.4% in total and 
58.8% for females), and are hence closer to the employment goals. This also suggests that their 
mobility is driven largely by the desire to work. However, non-EU national immigrants have 
exceedingly low employment rates. Unlike EU nationals, they are not well integrated into the 
                                                   
16   See for the numbers here and in the following European Communities (2003). 
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labour markets. Employment rates are around 50% for the total non-EU immigrant population, 
and around 40% for females. There is a substantial integration problem with respect to non-EU 
nationals in the European labour markets. Another marginalized group in Europe are the low-
skilled. Including foreigners and natives, their  total  employment rate in the EU is only 49%. 
Low-skilled natives and non-EU nationals compete for jobs. The mirror picture is provided by 
the unemployment statistics: EU national migrants exhibit a rate of 7.1% which is marginally 
below the 7.7% for the EU in total. Non-EU national migrants have a high unemployment rate of 
15.8%, which is even much higher than the 10.8% of the European uns killed.   
  This investigation has identified three important issues: First, the success of the Lisbon 
Agenda will depend mainly o n the ability to provide jobs for the low-skilled. (The employment 
rates of the medium-skilled (70.5%) and the high-skilled (82.8%) already fulfill the 70% rule.) It 
will also help to get more females into work, but the deficits with respect to the Lisbon goals are 
much smaller for females than for the low-skilled. Second, non-EU national migrants are largely 
underemployed.  This integration problem is not  only  socially  unsustainable, but also 
economically irrational. If more is done to attract the low-skilled population in general to enter 
employment, this may also help the non-EU national migrants since they are largely low-skilled. 
However, an even more active integration policy  with early training measures is desirable to  
attract non-EU nationals into work. Third, in the face of the current and probably rising deficits 
in skilled workers in the medium term, a selective immigration policy could help to reduce the 
inflow of low -skilled people and to obtain a creditable position on the international labour 
markets for high-skilled and well-trained workers.  
 
5. Conclusions and Policy Discussion 
 
Many European  labour markets are characterized by two seemingly contradictory trends. On the 
one hand, employers complain about a lack of skilled labour. On the other hand, the statistics   18 
measure a high level of  unemployed workers, typically low-skilled people. There are no 
indications that this will remain a short-term phenomenon; to the contrary, it is expected to 
continue and become even more marked. This indicates coordination deficiencies on the labour 
market. The qualification structure supplied  by the workers does not change as rapidly as the 
qualification requirements by the companies in the long-term process of structural change in the 
economy. At the same time, the foreseeable demographic trends will bring additional burden to 
Europe and will alter the society radically over the next few decades. An ageing population and a 
decline in its size will not leave the labour market unaffected. The growing age of the resident 
working population will lead to a shortage of young, highly qualified and suitable employees. 17 
A number of strategies are available to prepare proper policy responses.18 
5.1 Where Do We Stand Now? 
  Given the need to survive in highly competitive international markets with high 
innovative activity, it is an attractive strategy to execute a selective immigration policy to attract 
the  highly  qualified workers needed in innovative industries.  However, such a strategy is 
nowhere systematically  employed  in Europe. Hence, it is not surprising to observe that 
employment of migrants is relatively weak in export-oriented, research -intensive industries. 
Migrants are more attracted to those industries that face high import competition and employ less 
qualified workers. The competitive effects of this type of immigration are ambiguous.  Some 
have concluded that an influx of cheap low-quality labour may lead to a loss of competitiveness 
of the host country in the long-run, since it induces a slow-down in the adjustment process from 
                                                   
17   Some argue that aging will lead to a shortage of low-skilled labour because of the increasing demand for 
health- care services. While I agree that the health-care sector is a central future market that also attracts low-
skilled people, there are some doubts that this will be enough to employ the low-skilled workers. The sector 
will certainly attract also a larger share of the risingly needed high-skilled employees. The predictions for the 
low-skilled and the high-skilled workforce in Germany for the next decades provided in Zimmermann, Bauer, 
Bonin, Fahr and Hinte (2002) suggest that there will be excess demand for the high-skilled and excess supply 
for the low-skilled workers at a rising level. 
18   The f ollowing discussion has benefited from the author's participation in the preparation of  a report to the 
immigration committee headed by Rita S üßmuth that had supported the new German Immigration Law. See 
Zimmermann, Bauer, Bonin, Fahr and Hinte (2002). A revised draft with an evaluation of the new German 
immigration law will appear in English as Zimmermann, Bauer, Bonin, Fahr and Hinte (2004). 
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low-quality production to high-quality production. However, declining relative wages for low-
quality work are incentives for the native population to engage more in human capital formation 
to earn higher wages in the long-run. 
  Economists are tempted to advocate that the labour market should determine the size of 
immigration. Whatever the virtues of this approach are in principle, the social frictions created 
by immigration require an active policy for selecting immigrants and integrating them into the 
country, even when the problem of the existing persistent unemployment is ignored. The benefits 
of migration can only be reaped if the adjustment costs are addressed. If there are substantial 
immigration costs for the receiving countries, they can be compensated by imposing financial 
constraints on migrants to share the burden. From the view of many citizens in the destination 
countries, immigrants compete with the natives for scarce goods that "belong" in some sense to 
the citizens of a country. Being a citizen of a state is like membership in a club. As clubs, states 
may decide to request entry fees in some form from new members. Such instruments can be also 
used to regulate the immigration flows. 
  It has been  pointed out that immigration can successfully increase the flexibility of the 
labour market, provide incentives to slow down wage growth, and thus allow more people to 
obtain gainful employment. Immigrants are typically more flexible than natives. They may ease 
labour shortages in areas in which natives do not want to work and even create their own work 
opportunities. As they tend to be more responsive to labour market conditions than native 
workers, immigrants may help to smooth the adjustment of labour markets to regional 
differences or shocks. The increase in human capital that can be achieved by a selective 
immigration strategy can also contribute to long-run growth. However, in many countries there 
are strong differences in the economic performance of EU and non-EU migrants.19 Given these 
                                                   
19   See the findings reported in section 3.4. 
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possible gains, more openness of the European Union towards non-EU labour migration seems 
desirable , but also an economic approach to determine a more selective entry policy is required . 
  What kind of immigration is required depends on the particular economic situation. For 
instance, in the g olden 1960s with full employment in the labour markets and a need for low-
skilled workers, many Northern European countries were attracting blue-collar immigrants. 
Today, with the painful institutional constraints on the low-skilled labour markets and excess 
demand for skilled workers, the situation is more complicated: Since there is high unemployment 
among the low skilled due to institutional constraints like union wages, more unskilled migrants 
are only acceptable if there is proven evidence that they are willing to work, and their presence 
will make this market more competitive and hence add additional jobs for the natives through 
reduced wages. More promising are additional skilled immigrants: since they are in demand, the 
wages in the skilled labour market will not rise, but their employment will cause additional 
demand for native unskilled. Due to unemployment among the unskilled, their wages will remain 
constant. All in all economic immigration, properly organized, allows the economy to expand 
production with moderated wage growth. 
  Those concerned about immigration  sometimes suggest that the European economy 
might adjust in other ways. For example, it is sometimes argued that free trade and free capital 
mobility could replace free labour mobility. In other words, encourage potential migrants to 
work and export from their own countries. However, a substantial part of goods and services 
produced are non-tradable. Import competition due to cheap  or high quality labour abroad may 
also crowd out native workers, and foreign investment may have a similar impact. Controversial 
outsourcing strategies of jobs are already discussed or even prepared in many companies across 
Europe. Fostering free trade and free capital mobility is a good long-term strategy for economies 
to establish welfare that will neither stop short-term migration pressures nor could those 
strategies be implemented at short notice. A more flexible immigration policy would   21 
nevertheless help to keep the production of goods and services in Europe and  to  be better 
prepared for the future international competition. 
  Another argument is that immigration pressures due to differences in economic 
development could best be moderated by rapid domestic economic growth in the sending 
countries, thus advocating the need for economic transfers and development policies. However, 
the available evidence in developing countries suggests that a larger rate of development often 
destabilizes the economic system and creates new options for short-run out-migration. Allowing 
people from foreign nations to work in Europe enables them to train their human capital, send 
remittances home, intensify economic relationships between the host and the home countries  
and eventually return home. Labour migration is to a large extent rela ted to  future  return 
migration, as long mobility is not restricted. A filter effect can be observed: The more successful 
people stay, while the less successful move on. Hence, through a better world-wide allocation of 
resources and more flexible strategies to adjust and build up economies through migration, 
human capital building, remittances, and more intensified economic relationships, both the 
sending and the receiving countries will gain. 
  Other strategies are proposed to deal  with the declining work-force in Europe over the 
next decades, like mobilizing the unemployed and the female workforce, or increasing the 
retirement age and human capital investments. When concerns are raised about whether some of 
the marginal groups will provide the skill profile needed on the labour markets, it is suggested 
that the government could train and retrain the workforce. While these efforts are viable, to some 
extent, they are also long-run options with uncertain effects. For instance, even if women work 
as frequently as men in Germany, a country with very low female work participation and large 
demographic changes to come, the long-term decrease in the working  population can only be 
temporarily slowed down. But to achieve these increases in female work participation, a radical 
reform of the child care and training systems has to be  successfully carried out first. Similar 
considerations apply to a policy of increasing the retirement age. Such a strategy would produce   22 
a singular and possibly substantial short-term effect on labour supply which would, however, not 
reverse for long the decrease in the size of the resident working population. 
  One may question the need to stabilize the size of the workforce in a country, because 
there is no such thing as an optimal population size from an economic viewpoint. After some 
(may be considerable) time of adjustment, the economy will function around a lower or higher 
level. However, it is the adjustment process that creates painful pressures and that needs to be 
avoided. An ever falling native population causes a problem, because the economy could never 
adjust at a new and lower level. Hence, the European Union  needs to prepare a unified policy of 
selective labour immigration, to channel and coordinate the flows of immigrants that are almost 
certainly coming and to generate the supply of skilled mi grants that is so much needed. Past 
labour market experiences regarding immigrants have been rather beneficial, with no dramatic 
effects on native unemployment and wages. Even in the face of unemployment, immigration 
might be beneficial for society as a whole since it may erode institutional constraints on the 
labour market.  
  Migration, however, is not the ultimate solution to the aging problem since its cause, 
fertility decline, is not likely to get reversed due to the typically observed adjustment of migrant 
fertility to the standards of the natives. Also a  strongly growing share of migrants can cause 
integration problems and social tensions. The migration option is powerful  to moderate for some 
time the demographic adjustment pressure but it should be employed in a package of alternative 
responses.  The best strategy is to smooth the adjustment process employing all available 
strategies including immigration. 
5.2 A Conceptual Framework for Migration Policy 
  Migration policy is still  largely  under the control of the European Union member 
countries. However, due to the free labour, capital and product markets within  the union (with 
some temporary constraints in a transition period for the new member countries), there is a need 
to harmonize the single-country migration policies across Europe. An economic migration policy   23 
should be part of a strategic policy that supports the creation of a flexible and integrated 
European labour market. Currently, there are mobility restrictions for non-EU migrants and 
country-specific immigration rules for them. An inflow of non-EU labour immigrants in one 
country may affect the economies in all European Union partner countries through illegal flows, 
forced mobility of the natives, or adjustments through the capital and goods markets. If the 
necessary adjustments do not take place or if they are slow, then this will create economic 
inefficiencies.  
  Negative economic effects of such a policy in one country might call for policy 
coordination. For instance, if imported labour in the host country leads to the production of 
cheaper or better products, this will improve the competitive position of that country on the 
European markets. Consequently, the rise in imports in the EU partner countries will create 
competition with locally produced goods, losses in their market share and unemployment among 
the natives. Hence, any active and selective economically motivated immigration policy of one 
member country would harm the partner countries (as a devaluation policy would do in a world 
of fixed exchange rates). Current immigrants into Europe are mostly not economically motivated 
and they are, if at all, an economic burden for the host country; they are either economically 
inactive or they face high risks of unemployment since they have not the needed  labour market 
qualifications. This explains why there is currently no strong political pressure to coordinate 
economic immigration at the European level. It will, however, change as soon as some larger 
member countries like Germany will employ an  economic immigration channel. 
  Under the current constraints on the mobility and working possibilities of non-EU 
migrants,  it would be best if natives would move in response to immigration and act as a 
flexibility reserve. However, internal EU mobility is low and there might be virtues of 
immobility like substantial firm-specific human capital or strong preferences to remain in local 
social networks. Even the formation of the European Common Market was unable to stimulate  
mobility  significantly. It would, therefore, be the most profitable strategy if the legal constraints   24 
on non-EU migrants (and the temporary ones on natives from the new member countries) would 
be removed quickly to create a flexible pool of young,  educated  and highly-skilled  workers. 
These mobile workers would ensure for some time efficient adjustment and the creation of larger 
welfare across all EU member states. 
  Sometimes it is also argued that harmonization of immigration policies would not allow 
single countries to execute their preferences for generous welfare systems. To the contrary, an 
economically motivated immigration policy would avoid migrants that are at risk to take up 
welfare benefits, and would seek to attract individuals who are easily integrated into the 
economy. 
  From this discussion follows that it is  necessary to develop a joint European legal 
framework that guides the individual countries' migration policies. A n EU-wide quota for 
temporary and permanent visas would allow to fix the annual inflow of economic migrants at the 
political level. Europe needs to become an active player in the international labour markets. To 
develop an immigration policy with economic objectives, it is important to understand that the 
demand of an immigration country for immigrants with defined characteristics is part of a 
“market” in which supply is self-selected. If the immigration policy is to attract the immigrants 
most valuable to the immigration country on a market in which a number of nations compete for 
skilled labour, the institutional legal settings applicable to migrants must  be competitive with 
institutional settings in other countries, especially those who are currently seen as immigration 
countries.  
  The immigration policy to be developed must further account for the economic effects of 
migration. The degree to which immigrant labour is complementary  to or a substitute for resident 
labour determines the degree to which resident labour benefits as a result of labour immigration. 
Labour immigration will have negative consequences for a resident labour force that competes 
for the same jobs as the immigrants. If immigrants can be substituted for resident labour, 
displacement effects can occur and result in unemployment. If, on the other hand, immigrants   25 
contribute particular qualifications or fill existing vacancies, the economy and the working 
population will benefit. If migrant labour is even complementary to resident labour, immigration 
will improve the productivity of the resident working population and increase demand for their 
services. Unemployment will as a result decline. It is therefore a crucial responsibility of 
immigration policy to s elect migrants who will generate  the  most benefits for the national 
economy and are likely to enhance employment opportunities for the resident labour force. 
  Long-term and short-term immigration objectives  may differ. In the long run, the 
foreseeable population decline suggests a larger need for immigrants even if other measures such 
as the mobilization of female labour, the increase of the retirement age, and better education and 
training strategies were implemented. In the short term, less additional net immigration is 
needed. However, the profile of the current migrant stock can be changed to increase the share of 
people at work by increasing work incentives internally and by introducing a selective economic  
immigration policy for the new immigrants. The inflow of migrants for humanitarian and other 
undebatable legal reasons has become smaller recently.
20  A large number of immigrants, 
especially if they are economically active in the labour market, will eventually return home if 
labour mobility  is free. The temporary immigration  policy could distinguish between labour 
immigration in professions in short supply, the immigration of executives of multinational 
companies and researchers, student immigration and special cases. 
  This points out the need for a dual strategy for the efficient allocation of immigration 
rights that would result in a higher welfare in comparison to current migration policy. Such a 
strategy addresses both the supply and the demand of the labour market and is designed to select 
                                                   
20   This is also the consequence of a more effective control of non-economic immigration. Take Germany as an 
example: Over the last decades the average annual inflow was 700,000 and the average annual outflow was 
500,000 people, leaving a net inflow of 200,000. The number of immigrants who could be selected by an 
active labour immigration policy has increased to some 400,000 in recent years as a result of the decrease in 
ethnic Germans, asylum seekers and refugees entering Germany, and is likely to increase further. Since net 
immigration should rise to about 300,000 annually in the near future to compensate for demograp hic losses, 
and since return migration in the future should rise with a larger number of economic migrants in the country, 
more than 500,000 people entering Germany per year could be considered in the context of economic 
immigration.   26 
potential migrants with the highest value for the immigration country and jobs where the 
recruitment of an immigrant offers the highest benefits. An administrative process would appear 
to be the preferred choice for the selection of permanent immigrants. Such immigrants should be 
selected using o bservable and measurable criteria and preference should be given to better 
qualified applicants. Administrative  processes for allocating permanent immigration rights are 
widely used around the world as are top-down selection processes which are implemented by 
point systems in several traditional immigration countries. Empirical studies have shown that the 
average q ualifications of immigrants granted permanent residence visas by countries operating 
under point systems is higher than that of immigrants into the United  States where immigration 
is not controlled by economic criteria. Hence, a properly designed point system is able to impose 
the required labour market criteria on the inflow of migrants. This  observation should affect 
European immigration management. 
  A more detailed review of administrative practices in Canada, Australia and New Zealand 
demonstrates that the point systems operating in these countries may have fundamental features 
in common, but still vary substantially mainly regarding the rating of migrant characteristics. For 
instance, Australia puts, in contrast to the other countries, some weight on indicators of 
temporary l abour demand. Remarkable differences also exist with respect to the integration of 
the migrant family which has always been given substantial weight in Australia and New 
Zealand, but was, until recently, disregarded in Canada. The design of a point system thus allows 
for much flexibility. 
  Any economically motivated long-term  immigration  strategy should make a distinction 
between skilled labour, i nvestors and business immigrants. Business immigrants and investors 
create opportunities  for  employmen t and  income  and should therefore be highly welcome. 
Permanent labour immigrants should be  primarily selected by a point system. It should be a tool 
to select immigrants in accordance with demographic and economic needs. It will be necessary 
to define minimum requirements including above all a maximum age, minimum qualifications   27 
and adequate financial resources for an initial period in the country. A language test should be 
mandatory and a failure of the test could trigger an obligation of the immigrant to pay a security 
deposit which would be reimbursed following the successful completion of language tuition in 
the host country. In the point system, priority should be given to criteria such as age, education, 
qualifications and work experience  or a  prior  firm job offer. Integrational elements to be 
addressed by the point system include prior stays in Europe, relatives living in Europe, 
accompanying children and above all language skills. Applicants should be required to achieve a 
minimum score to be considered for permanent immigration. As immigration is permanent, an 
appropriate immigration program should be arranged based on a “ integration  contract” 
relationship between the immigrant and the society of which the immigrant will be a member. A 
European-wide quota on permanent migrants would allow fixing the number of permanent visas 
at the political level. 
  The immigration of investors and business people should be approved directly outside the 
point system. Investor immigration should exclusively be governed by the sum invested. For 
business people, on the other hand,  who invest into a new or an existing business, t he 
development of the business should be reviewed regularly.  Student immigration  should  be 
facilitated to create early ties of highly qualified young persons in  Europe. The selection of 
undergraduates should be left entirely to universities. Strict local native language requirements 
are not so important, but the academic courses should be taught in English. After graduation, 
student immigrants should have the right to obtain permanent residence  if they have a concrete 
job offer. Immigrants taking up firm traineeships or apprenticeships should also be allowed to 
enter the country under the student program. 
  The urgent need for short-term skilled labour should be accommodated by  establishing a 
non-bureaucratic system for temporary immigration. Unfortunately, it is very difficult if not 
impossible for a public administrator or an outside observer to identify the real short-term needs 
of the b usiness community. Hence, an auction system operating among interested companies for   28 
the allocation of immigration certificates would appear to be the best choice to satisfy temporary 
immigration needs. These certific ates would entitle the company to recruit an immigrant  on the 
world market for a job for a d efined period of time. Such an auction system translates relative 
labour market shortages into relative bid prices. Existing shortages would become transparent 
and  excess demand would show where further  policy  response is necessary. Since companies 
would hav e to pay for the right to hire a worker, a share of the immigration gains would be given 
to  the public coffers. A European -wide quota  on temporary migrants would allow fixing the 
number of temporary visas at the political level. 
  An auction system is superior to alternatives such as a fee system mainly as it matches 
supply and demand more efficiently. Companies will only be willing to purchase at an auction if 
they are unable to satisfy  their demand on  the regular local  labour market. The objective of the 
auction can be underscored by a  minimum bid requirement. There is no need  to formally  verify 
the non-availability of native labour. The certificates should be limited to a period of three years, 
and could be potentially renewable for the same person. Temporary immigrants should have the 
right to be accompanied by their family members, and spouses should be entitled to a work 
permit. During their employment under this programme, temporary immigrants should have the 
right to apply for permanent immigration under the point system. Such an arrangement would 
create an appropriate link between the temporary and the permanent immigration systems.  
  A problematic case is the relationship between economic and non-economic immigration, 
especially asylum seekers.21 It is possible to design a joint system for asylum seekers and 
immigrants where immigrants are ranked according to an economic point system and asylum 
seekers are awarded humanitarian points on a scale according to the gravity of their 
circumstances. Only those in both groups reaching the minimum point score are admitted. Policy 
makers would have to decide on the appropriate structure of the point system, the minimum 
                                                   
21   See Hatton (2004) and Zimmermann (1995a) for this issue. 
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thresholds, and an overall quota for both groups. Then actual relative supply of applicants would 
determine the allocation of the entry permits.  
 
6. Policy Conclusions 
 
European Union economies are pressed by two seminal challenges: A demographic change that 
induces population ageing and a decline of the workforce, and a split labour market that is 
characterized by high levels of unemployment for low -skilled people and a simultaneous 
shortage of skilled workers. This lack of flexible high-skilled workers and the aging process has 
created the image of an immobile labour force and the eurosklerosis phenomenon. Mobility 
ensures the best allocation of resources, and hence economic efficiency. But in the face of local 
or firm-specific human capital and individual preferences to remain in stable social  networks 
immobility has also virtues. In such a situation, an economically motivated European 
immigration policy can generate high welfare improvements. A selective policy that discourages 
unskilled migrants and attracts skilled foreign workers will vitalize the labour market, foster 
growth and increase demand for unskilled  native workers. Their wages will increase and their 
unemployment rates will decrease, respectively. When migrants are different, when they bring 
variety in the labor market and improve the host country's ability to speedily adjust the economy 
to its long-run needs, they are of invaluable help.  Note that while immigration has many 
dimensions (including social and humanitarian), this paper deals with the issue from a purely 
economic perspective. 
  There is a need to harmonize the single -country migration policies across Europe. Crucial 
is to determine a European-wide quota for economic non-EU immigrants and to allow them to be 
fully mobile. This will help to create a flexible and integrated European labour market. 
Currently, there is free labour mobility of EU natives (with a transition period for people of the 
new member states), but mobility restrictions for non-EU migrants and country-specific   30 
immigration rules for them. An inflow of labour immigrants in one country may affect the 
economies in all European Union partner countries through illegal flows, forced mobility of the 
natives, or adjustments through the capital and goods markets. If the necessary adjustments do 
not take place or if they are slow, this will create economic inefficiencies. Under these 
conditions, it would be best if natives would move. However, internal EU mobility is low and 
even the formation of the European Common Market has not significantly stimulated it. It 
would, therefore, be beneficial if the legal constraints on non-EU migrants (and the temporary 
ones on natives from the new member countries) would be removed quickly to ensure efficient 
adjustment and larger welfare across all EU member states. It is further necessary to develop a 
joint European legal framework that guides the individual countries migration policy activities.  
  Europe needs to become an active player on the international labour markets. The 
European Union has to set European-wide quotas for net i mmigration on a permanent and 
temporary level. Long-term or permanent immigration should be governed by the introduction of 
a point system at the European level. It should be a tool for selecting immigrants in accordance 
with demographic and economic needs. In the point system, priority should be given to criteria 
such as age, education,  qualifications, language skills and work experience or an existent firm 
job offer. Short-term or temporary immigration is best organized through an auction of work-
permits among interested companies. Through this process, the companies would not only reveal 
their real preferences for foreign workers, but also contribute a share of the immigration gains to 
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